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at Case Western Reserve University

WINTER 1995
DIRECTOR’S CORNER

by Robert P. Lawry

1 am delighted to report that the C.P.E. has received a generous $200,000 grant from
the 1525 Foundation to conduct a Summer Ethics Institute over the next two years. The Institute
is designed to help faculty throughout the University develop a deeper understanding of ethics,
so they may do more ethics teaching themselves within their own disciplines. This idea of
pursuing ethics education throughout the curriculum is a direct result of a recommendation made
several years ago in a report to C. W.R. U. President Agnar Pytte by an Ad Hoc Committee
established to investigate the state of teaching ethics in the undergraduate school. Thus, special
consideration will be given to undergraduate teachers in looking at applicants for the Institute.
John Bassett, the Dean of the College ofArts & Sciences, is very supportive of this effort, having
established ethics as one of the key themes of curriculum reform in the undergraduate school.
More details of the grant are set forth in another part of this newsletter; so I will not
elaborate further on it. However, 1 would like to extend a deep public bow to Susan Jaros,
Associate Vice President for Development and Alumni Affairs, for her indefatigable efforts over
several years to find this money for us; and to President Pytte, not only for his direct help in
obtaining this grant, but also for his continued support of the C.P.E. and the cause of ethics
education in the University.
For me this a dream come true. 1 can’t wait to welcome the 15 colleagues who will join
with us in June, 1996, to deepen the ethics dialogue at C.W.R. U.

The bulk of this Newsletter is taken up by a thoughtful article, penned by Brenda Wirkus,
our colleague and friend from John Carroll, who directs the Ethics Program there. 1 asked
Brenda and our own Tom Murray, Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics, if they would
lead us in a discussion of the very basic and very tricky question: Why Be Moral? They did so
at our Dialogue Luncheon on November 2nd. Their opening statements were so thoughtful, 1
asked each if they would take their notes and develop them into a short article for all the readers
of this Newsletter to be similarly stimulated. 1 managed to track Brenda down in University
Heights, and she said 1 asked so nicely, she couldn’t refuse. On the other hand, last time I
checked, Murray was flying off to Germany to give a talk at an international bioethics
conference. Or was he just trying to elude me? Meanwhile, read Brenda. It will make you
think ... and ponder.

WHY BE MORAL?
(Author's Note: This talk was originally presented as part of the Nov. 2, 1995,
"Ethics Dialogue Luncheon " series. What follows is a slightly more forma! version of
that talk, one still designed to provoke thought rather than to resolve philosophical
quandaries.)
My initial and almost automatic response to the question "Why be moral?" is
"because I couldn't live with myself if I weren't." Always wary of answers predicated
upon the precarious state of my own psyche, I thought 1 needed to investigate further.
"Why couldn't I live with myself if I weren't moral?" But that didn't seem to advance
my inquiry very much. Besides,, one of my good friends reminded me that my answer
was hardly going to persuade anyone else except, maybe, those suffering from similar
psychological diseases.
Once upon a time, moral philosophers would have addressed the question "Why
be moral?" by attempting to provide a foundation for morality, by attempting to
ground it and anchor it in something else. Often they turned to "nature" as the
ground; "nature" sometimes meant human nature and sometimes the structure of the
universe, the "order of things," often "the order of things as produced by a creator."
And, frequently, "human nature" had something to do with "rationality," often
premised upon a belief that its creator is rational. But in the wake of pragmatism and
postmodernism at the end of the 20th century, that infrastructure appears increasingly
shaky.
Many who argue that morality is natural maintain that being moral is just part
of what it means to be human, what separates us from the animals. Anthropological
studies do indicate a moral structure in all human societies, and can even offer an
account of deviance from moral codes due to extreme environmental changes.
Others claim that morality is part of the natural order ordained by God. For
them, it is still necessary to investigate nature in order to determine right and wrong
actions, and we are still capable of making mistakes about that nature (because our
mind is imperfect and cannot read God's mind). But in that context it makes no
sense to ask whether one ought to be moral. And, in many such traditions, deciding
not to be moral risks punishment by God.
Finally, the answer that it is somehow "rational" to be moral takes many forms
in the history of philosophy, in philosophers ranging from Plato to Kant. To
investigate these many forms would entail something along the lines of a doctoral

dissertation. Let it suffice to say that much of the history of philosophy, aMeast until
the 19th century, consists of many and varied attempts to ground morality in some
picture of rationality.
I asserted above that these foundations have become increasingly unsteady,
that these answers are less satisfying than they once were. Language about the
"natural" often presupposes the existence of God. Therefore, it obviously cannot
work as well in our pluralistic world as it would have, for example, in the shared
worldview of medieval, monotheistic Europe. Or else language about the "natural"
is based upon an ontology about which 20th-century thinkers have become quite
wary, a realist ontology based upon an epistemology of discovery rather than social
construction. Or sometimes language about the "natural" is derived from empirical
data from certain societies that generalizes to all humans, leaving us with concerns
about the soundness of inductive conclusions.
The language of "rationality" leaves us with many of the concerns cited in the
above paragraph as well as with different worries depending upon the different
philosophical presentation. But even supposing that we accep.t the answer that it is
rational for US to be moral, that doesn't explain why I - why any one single individual
- should be moral. What I have in mind here is someone who is perfectly rational and
perfectly calculating and perfectly deliberative. This kind of person wants everyone
else to act morally so that s/he can have certain expectations and figure out how to
plan his/her life to work around them. And thereby act immorally with impunity. I am
reminded here of the story of the ring of Gyges, recounted by Plato in his Republic,
Book II (359b-360e). Gyges found a ring which made him invisible and proceeded to
seduce the king's wife, kill the king, and take over his kingdom. Glaucon's argument
in this passage is that anyone who thought he could get away with acting immorally
would do so. That somehow it is not irrational to act immorally, especially if others
continue to act morally.
So I'm back where I started. Some of the standard philosophical answers to
"why be moral" seem less impressive now than once they might have for reasons
cited above and more. I'm back to my "I couldn't live with myself any other way"
answer. Rather than dismiss this merely as an indication of my (possibly aberrant)
psychological state, let's explore it a bit more seriously.
The idea of "living with oneself" has something to do with one's image or
picture of oneself and how that fits into the larger picture of one's life as some sort
of narrative. This image or picture goes beyond a particular moral theory and asks,
instead, for an analysis of "a good life."

What makes a life "good"? What a question! While we cannot but begin to
answer it, let me try here to develop a few thoughts. Two things we seem to value
are friendship/love and "self-realization'V'self-actualization." I am not sure whether
friendship and love are the same; I know that we have neither the time nor the space
here to make distinctions between them. They do seem, however, to be related. The
language of "self-realization" and ’'self-actualization" comes out of a philosophical
tradition tied to Hegel but exemplified in the works of certain Anglo-American
Hegelians (Green, Royce, Bradley, Bosanquet). That language has since been
appropriated by the psychologists for different ends and with different meanings. By
"self-realization" I mean simply the potential to develop oneself freely by confronting
and trying out a variety of possibilities.
Both of these (friendship/love and self-realization/self-actualization) are extra
moral goods or values. I am not prepared here to argue that they are universal values,
although I find it hard to imagine anyone who would not value them. I am fairly
certain that the practices that go along with them are NOT universal but vary over
time and across cultures. At the very least, within our culture they are perceived to
be good. These goods follow from certain other goods, things like self-respect. And
while these may all appear to be individual goods, and of course they are, they are
also goods obtainable only in and through our relationships with others. That is, they
can be acquired only in community/ies. This is easy to see with friendship and love
(although it disturbs me no end to see our popular culture insist that you can only love
someone else if you love yourself first. I think that's entirely wrong-headed.).
It's a bit more difficult to see that self-realization, self-actualization, depends
upon community/ies. But a moment's reflection, here, can help to illustrate that. To
truly become/actualize/realize oneself, one needs to be able to envision a range of
possible selves one might become. One needs to develop one's potentials, simply
put. But how does one discover what one's potentials are, except by trying out a
number of different things within community, except by getting feedback from others?
This process is ongoing and interactive; none of us, I suspect, wants to become a
static self. Few of us, philosophically, any longer believe in a substantial self. We
want new possibilities and new options, all of which are constructed by our
community/ies. But any such community can only foster the kinds of growth, change,
and actualization I'm suggesting if, in fact, it is structured to allow the flourishing of
those possibilities for everyone within it. Because my self-realization depends upon
the realization of others, and because that is a process of continuing but changing and
re-negotiated relationships, the social structure must maximize freedom for those
relationships and their renegotiation. And MORALITY is the name I would give to
that structure and those processes. Obviously, the greater the array of possibilities
for experimentation and negotiation, and the greater array of pictures of possible

personhood provided, the more moral the society.
Thus, the various communities in which we participate provide options and
teach us what counts as a good life. To refuse to engage actively with others in
those processes of conversation and negotiation, to refuse to participate openly in
those communities, is to refuse to be moral. And to do that is to alienate oneself
from the very sources of self-construction.
I view this essay as just one preliminary piece of a conversation about morality.
I've left much of this vague and undeveloped. But let me conclude with just one
thought. Many will argue that my position lends itself to relativism, to the view that
any society is self-contained and constructed and so immune to criticism from
outside, because I've offered no universal, over-riding, absolute values. After all, our
picture of "the good life" might look very different from one produced by another
community. I would respond that, first of all, we all participate in any number of
communities, include the world or global community, and these communities are
interconnected and interrelated. They, too, should be talking with one another.
Secondly, I would argue that even without some universal, absolute moral rules, we
can still evaluate communities according to the criteria I've suggested above. Do they
promote a larger or smaller range of possibilities for self-realization? Do they promote
more or fewer ways of negotiating with one another? Do they allow all members to
participate in these processes, or do they exclude some? Are members free to change
membership in communities, or are they tied permanently to them?
In short, I think the moral skeptic is not easily defeated. But I suspect that
many of us will admit to having a picture of our "better" selves that guides us through
life, a picture which helps us set standards, a picture against which we can measure
our progress as moral beings, a picture which is open-ended and allows us to develop
new pictures, a picture which is refined in and through our relationships with others.
And perhaps that's enough.

- Brenda A. Wirkus, Ph.D.
John Carroll University
Associate Professor of
Philosophy and
Director, Program in
Applied Ethics

A MILESTONE FOR THE C.P.E.
Since its inception in the Fall of 1978, the Center for Professional Ethics has been
dedicated to the ethical education and development of students within the University. Through
the years the Center has sponsored an array of activities aimed at increasing ethical awareness
in the faculty, as well as the students. In spite of the success of these programs there remained
one long-range goal that appeared to be almost unachievable; but in October of this year that
dream finally became a reality.
October, 1995, is when the 1525 Foundation awarded a $200,000 grant to the C.P.E. to
fund a Summer Fellowship Program for the next two years. The purpose of this program is
intensify the knowledge of ethics among the undergraduate faculty at C.W.R.U., enabling them
to incorporate ethics into courses in their own disiplines. Upon conclusion of this program 30
Fellows (15 per year) will have designed a course or a substantial part of a course they presently
teach or will teach within the next two years to reflect ethics content.
Fellows will be chosen from applications of faculty members from the entire university
community. Some preference will be given to faculty who teach primarily in the undergraduate
curriculum, because it was a study of that need which was the impetus for seeking the grant.
Fellows will be expected to spend most of their working hours in June to a study of ethics.
They will each receive a stipend of $3,000 for their efforts plus materials and special meals.
Obtaining this grant marked a red-letter day for the C.P.E. We hope that the university
community will feel the same when the Fellows begin to introduce ethics into their classes.

NEWS & NOTES
CONFERENCES:
The Association for Practical
and
Professional
Ethics
announces
its
fifth
annual
meeting to be held February 29March 2, 199 6 in St. Louis.
Amy Gutmann will deliver the
keynote address “Responses to
Racial Injustice.” Gutmann is
an accomplished author, as well
as. Dean of the Faculty and
Professor
of
Politics
at
Princeton University.
Other
features at the meeting will
be:
a conference on Public
Service
Ethics
and
Public
Trust,
Colloguium on Ethics
Centers
and
Programs,
a
symposium
on
Casuistry
and
Breakfast with an Author.
For
more information contact the
APPE, 410 North Park Avenue,
Bloomington, IN 47405.
Phone
(812) 855-6450 or Fax (812)
855-3315.
*

*

*

On March 7-9, 1996 California
State University, Long Beach is
sponsoring
its
7th
Annual
Conference on Applied Ethics
entitled “Facing the Challenge:
The Ethical Stretch."
This
event, which will be held at
the Hilton Hotel in Long Beach,
CA, was designed to promote
continuous improvement in the
practice and theory of ethics
across the professions.
The
conference identifies, but is
not limited to,
five major
areas of discussion on ethics:
Law,
Education,
Business,
Government and International
Ethics.
Contact Delona Davis
for information by phone (310)
985-8222 or fax (310) 985-5842.

*

*

*

An event titled “Ethical Issues
and Technology Utilization” on
March 9, 1996 will be the First
Annual Ethics and Technology
Conference sponsored by Loyola
University in Chicago.
The
following
topics
may
be
covered:
Ethical Standards,
Equal Access,
Students with
computers and Software Ethics.
For information contact Dr.
Linda Salchenberger; Dept, of
Management Science; School of
Business;
Loyola
University
Chicago; 820 N. Michigan Ave.;
Chicago, IL 60611-2103.
*

*

*

The
Department
of
Medical
Humanities at the East Carolina
University School of Medicine
and Bioethics Center announces
a conference to be held on
March 18, 1996. The conference
"Controversies in Bioethics”
will discuss issues about the
end of life, moral decision
making
and
managed
care.
Contact Katherine McGinnis by
phone at (919) 816-8214 or by
fax (919) 816-8596 for more
information.

WORKSHOPS:
Indiana University is inviting
nominations for the "Research
Ethics in Education” workshop
designed to prepare leaders of
the
next
generat ion
of
scientists and engineers to
confront significant issues in
research ethics.
Participant
support
will
be
offered.
Deadline is March 1, 1996. For
eligibility requirements and
other information contact Brian
Schrag by phone at (812) 8556450 or fax (812) 855-3315.

aaxsanoau
ssauoav

NOLLOaUUOO

Z90Z-90l^t o<MO 'pueiaA»io - anusAy P'long 0O6OI • nUMD • U^H l«»A CCZ
Xll^JdAjUf) dAJdSd^j UidlSd/^ dSO^ )0

S3N>3

|ouoisse*o«
jd)ud3

Center for Professional Ethics
MEMBERSHIP
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Cleveland, Ohio 44106-7057

